DEBATE
BAZE-D AND CONFUSED: WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH LETHAL
INJECTION?
th

On January 7 , the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the
case of Baze v. Rees, which asks the Justices to examine the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection methodology. As the Court deliberates over the issues involved, an informal nationwide moratorium
on lethal injections has been established. In this Debate Professors
Alison J. Nathan, of Fordham University, and Douglas A. Berman, of
The Ohio State University, tease out the legal, political, and practical
issues that the Court faces as it addresses Baze.
In her Opening, Professor Nathan critiques the irrationality of the
three-formula lethal injection procedure used by Kentucky and many
other states. Professor Nathan writes that “lethal injection as pervasively practiced in the United States today is the result of a historical
accident, not scientifically informed deliberation.” She contends that
the sort of democratic reform that has been the catalyst for legislative
changes in execution procedures in the past has been stymied by “lethal injection’s peculiar history, attendant secrecy, and protocol involving the use of [a] pain-masking paralytic drug.” She concludes by
arguing that “[i]n this context of non-transparency, it is distinctly the
role and responsibility of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to
scrutinize the practice of lethal injection and its history.”
Professor Berman agrees that “the development and administration of lethal injection protocols have been haphazard and sloppy.”
However, his concern is principally focused on why the lack of a democratic reform movement has failed to raise the consciousness of the
nation. He contends that “three critical practical and political realities” explain the absence of a national backlash: in sum, 1) no human-administered death penalty system can be perfect; 2) few Americans care to make a perfect system; and 3) most Americans are
“blissfully ignorant” of any such “imperfections.” Through his “realpolitik” lenses, Professor Berman remains skeptical that the Justices
will be able to rise above “the broader practical and political realities
that surround the modern administration of capital punishment [and
help] ensure that the machinations of death . . . persist.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
Lethal Injection’s Known Unknowns
†

Alison J. Nathan

The United States Supreme Court has recently heard oral argument in the case of Baze v. Rees, a constitutional challenge to the lethal
injection procedures that Kentucky uses to execute death row inmates. Kentucky’s lethal injection formula is the same employed by
almost every death penalty state in the country. As a result, the day
after the Court granted certiorari in Baze, I argued that because the
Supreme Court is considering the standard by which such challenges
must be judged, for the sake of even-handed and deliberative justice,
all lethal injection executions across the nation should be stayed
pending the Court’s decision in Baze (see http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forumy/2007/09/pausing-machinery-of-death-supreme.php).
One
execution did go forward in Texas on the same day that Baze was
granted, apparently as a result of the refusal by the Chief Justice of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to allow the twenty-minute late filing
of the condemned man’s stay request. Since that time, however, every
scheduled execution (nineteen as of the time of this writing) has been
temporarily stayed by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, state
courts, or governors. This national pausing of the machinery of death
has garnered significant press attention and some controversy, even
leading a few commentators to suggest that lethal injection challenges
are, at base, nothing more than a death-row delay tactic. This is a significant error. How states execute convicted defendants is an issue
that implicates important aspects of governmental transparency and
democratic reform, and should be a serious concern both to those
who support the death penalty and those who oppose it. What we
know about how states and the federal government currently execute
people in the United States is deeply troubling—troubling enough
that the Supreme Court has involved itself in the controversy. But the
real danger of lethal injection as currently practiced lies in what we do
not know. A number of historical and structural factors have coa-

†

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Nathan is counsel of record for an amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioners in Baze
v. Rees, which she filed on behalf of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law.
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lesced to shroud the administration of lethal injection in secrecy.
These factors have entrenched, rather than cured, a needlessly cruel
practice. This lack of transparency must change, and it is the existence of constitutional judicial review that will ensure that it does.
One thing we know for sure about lethal injection is its macabre
history. As shown by the research of one of the leading experts in this
field, Professor Deborah Denno of Fordham University School of Law,
lethal injection as pervasively practiced in the United States today is
the result of a historical accident, not scientifically informed deliberation. The genesis of today’s method of lethal injection can be traced
to 1976, the year the Supreme Court decided Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), and ended the nine-year execution hiatus that had begun
in the period leading up to the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972). After almost a decade without an execution, intense
public scrutiny accompanied the preparations for the post-Gregg executions. In this context, and in order to help maintain public support for the death penalty, some state legislators scrambled to find a
more humane substitute to the viscerally brutal and painful electric
chair or gas chamber, the two methods that previously had gained national dominance but were facing increasing public scrutiny and criticism. Legislators in Oklahoma moved first.
Seeking guidance on how to carry out a potentially more humane
execution, two Oklahoma state senators turned to the state’s chief
medical examiner, Dr. A. Jay Chapman. Although Dr. Chapman conceded that he lacked relevant training or expertise—stating at the
time that he “‘was an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that way,’” Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 49, 66 (2007)—he conjured up a procedure that would become
the basis for lethal injection protocols nationwide. The Oklahoma
legislators did not receive input from experts, did not conduct or
commission any studies, and failed to consider the foreseeable administrative difficulties and dangers of Dr. Chapman’s proposed procedure. Nevertheless, in 1977, Oklahoma’s legislature adopted Dr.
Chapman’s method and delegated important details—what specific
drugs to use, what dosage to administer, who would administer the
drugs and how—to unqualified prison officials who made administrative decisions free from public scrutiny and oversight. After further
consultation between Dr. Chapman and state prison officials, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt a three-drug lethal injection protocol—a short-acting anesthetic, a paralyzing agent, and a heartstopping drug—as its preferred method of execution. Texas followed
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immediately afterwards, becoming the first state to actually carry out a
lethal injection execution, which it did in 1982, using the three-drug
protocol.
Despite the inadequate origins of Oklahoma’s lethal injection
protocol, a ripple effect soon occurred. State after state followed Oklahoma’s lead, uncritically borrowing its new three-drug formula and
delegating important details to state prison officials who lacked pertinent experience and knowledge. By 2002, thirty-seven states had
switched to lethal injection, with all but one state employing Dr.
Chapman’s original three-drug formula. Yet none of these states engaged in any additional medical or scientific study of the method they
were adopting. Historical accident (or what sociologists would call a
“cascade to mistaken consensus”) explains far better than science or
medicine the current ubiquity of the three-drug protocol.
We also know, as a result of information just beginning to emerge,
that there have been seriously flawed lethal injection executions. For
example, in May of 2007, an Ohio inmate named Christopher Newton
appeared to be suffocating alive during parts of an execution that
lasted almost two hours. Newton’s botched execution came one year
after a similarly controversial execution in Ohio that lasted approximately ninety minutes and caused the state to reexamine its execution procedures. This execution was sufficiently gruesome that the
brother of the victim, who witnessed the execution, has gone on
record condemning the lethal injection process as unnecessarily cruel.
As another example, it took the state of Florida thirty-four minutes to
execute Angel Diaz in 2006. During that time Diaz was flailing, gasping for air, grimacing, and struggling to breathe. A postexecution investigation concluded that Diaz was likely not properly anesthetized
during the execution. According to the Florida Supreme Court, the
execution “raised legitimate concerns about the adequacy of Florida’s
lethal injection procedures and the ability of the [Department of Corrections] to implement them.” Lightbourne v. McCollum, No. SC062391, 2007 WL 3196533, at *16 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2007). Given the incidences of error-prone and flawed executions, it is unsurprising that
the three-drug protocol is forbidden for use in animal euthanasia by
most states.
The public also is beginning to learn that unqualified individuals
are providing guidance and participating in executions, creating circumstances ripe for error. In addition to relying on Dr. Chapman’s
admittedly inexpert opinions, many states received guidance in administering lethal injection from Fred Leuchter, who was a leading fig-
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ure in the execution equipment “business” of electric chairs and gas
chambers. Despite Mr. Leuchter’s dearth of experience with lethal
injection, states relied on his advice for years before they learned, during the course of his providing testimony about gas chambers in support of a holocaust denier, that he had lied about his scientific qualifications and educational background, for which he was subsequently
prosecuted. Yet Mr. Leuchter’s “lethal injection machine” played a
role in further entrenching the three-drug protocol nationwide.
Similarly, recent lethal injection litigation in Missouri exposed
that the doctor involved in that state’s lethal injection executions,
known as “Dr. Doe” because his identity was steadfastly guarded by
Missouri, was the subject of more than twenty malpractice suits and
suffers from a form of dyslexia that affects his ability to prepare the
drug combinations properly. As a result of this information, a federal
judge in Missouri banned his participation in future executions. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 2:05-CV-04173-FJG, at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/
LethalInjection/Public/MoralesTaylorAmicus/27.pdf. Despite this,
the Los Angeles Times recently reported that the very same doctor has
continued to assist the federal government in preparing lethal injection executions of federal inmates. There is also evidence emerging
of ill-trained executioners in California, including one who smuggled
illegal drugs into the prison. And in Kentucky, the execution protocol
allowed improperly trained executioners to insert catheters into an
inmate’s neck despite a doctor’s refusal to do so. Even Dr. Chapman
now agrees that the wrong drugs are being used and that states should
be compelled to use expert personnel rather than the “complete
idiots . . . [w]hich we seem to have.” Denno, supra, at 73.
Arguably more alarming than what we know of the current practice of lethal injection is what we do not know. Several aspects of the
history of lethal injection have caused a continued repression of public knowledge and scrutiny of the procedure and its implementation.
First, public scrutiny of the three-drug protocol has been stifled because, in copying Oklahoma, state after state has adopted the unnecessary paralytic agent as its second drug. The nature of this drug is to
mask the realities of the execution from meaningful public scrutiny. A
paralyzed inmate suffering pain during the execution will be physically unable to express his suffering. As a result, witnesses, including
members of the media who report executions to the public, see only a
sanitized version. Unaware of the painful suffering endured by inmates, the public has assumed wrongly that states always execute inmates in a humane and painless manner.
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Second, by copying Oklahoma’s vague lethal injection protocol,
states also have followed Oklahoma in delegating critical implementation decisions to department of corrections personnel. The procedures these personnel develop are often exempt from state administrative law notice-and-comment requirements or have been treated as
exempt by prison personnel. As a result, prison officials’ critical lethal
injection implementation decisions—what specific drugs to use, what
dosage amounts, and how to administer the drugs—have remained
hidden from public scrutiny.
Third, states have frustrated attempts to evaluate lethal injection
protocols and procedures by tenaciously guarding the information as
secret and nonpublic. In addition to refusing to release information
about the qualifications and training of executioners, states also conceal execution procedures by limiting witnesses’ ability to view portions of the execution process and by refusing to release postexecution autopsy information. The public, therefore, is precluded from
learning of flawed procedures, incompetent administration, and execution errors.
Taken together, lethal injection’s peculiar history, attendant
secrecy, and protocol involving the use of the pain-masking paralytic
drug have produced—and continue to produce—a failure of democratic reform. In the past, public scrutiny of cruel punishment practices led to legislative changes. For example, in the early-to-midtwentieth century, nearly every state sought to introduce a more humane method of execution when the public learned of the actual horrors of the electric chair, and deemed electrocution to be too barbaric
and open to a high risk of pain and error relative to other available
options. The same was true for hanging before electrocution and the
gas chamber. In contrast, the factors described here have led to systematic and continued repression of public information related to lethal injection’s actual procedures and administration, undermining a
similar process of public deliberation and democratic reform. As a result, a needlessly risky and unnecessarily cruel method has become entrenched. This is true despite readily available alternatives such as the
method veterinarians typically use to euthanize animals: a massive
overdose of a single drug barbiturate. Veterinarians favor this approach because it does not carry a significant risk of pain even if unforeseen errors in the implementation process occur.
In this context of non-transparency, it is distinctly the role and responsibility of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to scrutinize
the practice of lethal injection and its history, as well as to see through
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the ill-informed and reflexive state decision making that has perpetuated an execution method that needlessly risks severe and unnecessary pain.
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REBUTTAL
The Bliss of Ignorance and the Perfection Problem
†

Douglas A. Berman

Professor Nathan’s Opening Statement provides an effective account of why the Supreme Court has now finally come to examine the
constitutionality of modern execution procedures. As she spotlights,
the development and administration of lethal injection protocols have
been haphazard and sloppy, and state internal reviews of protocols
have mostly been nonexistent or perfunctory. Jurisdictions that utilize
the death penalty generally have not fulfilled their moral and constitutional obligations to ensure that unreasonable execution methods
are not utilized. I thus agree with Professor Nathan that, in light of
the failings of other branches, “it is distinctly the role and responsibility of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to scrutinize” prevailing
lethal injection protocols.
But Professor Nathan’s essay fails to examine the reasons why so
many states have tended to repress “public information related to lethal injection’s actual procedures and administration” and the deeper
death penalty dilemmas that in part account for the absence of a
“process of public deliberation and democratic reform” concerning
prevailing protocols. Specifically, Professor Nathan does not grapple
with three critical practical and political realities that surround the
modern administration of capital punishment: (1) a perfect death
penalty system is practically impossible for fallible humans to create
and maintain; (2) few persons actively involved with or concerned
about modern death penalty systems are genuinely interested in making these systems more perfect; and (3) the vast majority of democratic lawmakers and the public in general is blissfully ignorant of the
modern death penalty’s imperfections. These critical practical and
political realities infect all legal and social debates over capital punishment, and they significantly impede effective tinkering with the
machinery of death. Though each of these realities justifies a lengthy
law review article, here I will briefly unpack them with an emphasis on
how they impact the lethal injection debate.
†

William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Professor Berman has written extensively on lethal injection litigation at
his blog, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://www.sentencing.typepad.com.
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1. Fallibility. In the words of renowned pop philosopher Hannah
Montana, “Nobody’s perfect.” Indeed, the reality of human error is
often stressed by death penalty opponents who contend that even the
smallest risks of wrongful executions justify the abolition of capital
punishment. In the wake of death row exonerations, the fallibility argument resonates with many, but this argument is largely inconsistent
with how we assess other governmental functions. The well-known
and unavoidable risk of human error does not keep governments
from engaging in many life-and-death activities—ranging from waging
war to regulating drug safety to running a public transit system—if the
public and lawmakers view the benefits of these activities to be worth
the risks. Of course, governments generally aspire to reduce the risks
of human error as much as possible, but nobody argues that city buses
should stop running when one driver negligently causes a fatal crash.
In the context of lethal injection protocols, the reality of human
fallibility means that there will always be at least some risk of error and
unnecessary pain in any state killing process. Of course, the selection
of execution methods and execution personnel can greatly impact the
magnitude of these risks: hangings conducted by untrained government officials—the execution norm throughout most of American
history—surely will create greater risks of error and unnecessary pain
than lethal injections conducted by trained medical personnel.
As Professor Nathan notes, over the last century governments have
generally aspired to adopt more humane methods of execution, apparently recognizing that they should try to minimize the risk of error
and unnecessary pain in administering the death penalty. Problematically, as Professor Nathan stresses, a “cascade to mistaken consensus”
has led nearly all capital jurisdictions to adopt an imperfect three-drug
lethal injection protocol. And yet, there is little doubt that the prevailing protocol is still a significant improvement over other execution
methods; defendants are not clamoring for a return of the hangman’s
noose or the electric chair, and capital jurisdictions are not seriously
considering building new gas chambers or assembling firing squads.
The formal terms of the modern debate over lethal injection protocols concern whether states, after having adopted an improved, but
still flawed execution method, should now have to make their protocols even more perfect. But, as explained below, few persons actively
involved with, or seriously concerned about, modern death penalty
systems are genuinely interested in trying to make these systems more
perfect.
2. Modern Disinterest in an Even More Perfect System. For nearly all
death row defendants, their lawyers, and opponents of capital pu-
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nishment, the only perfect death penalty system is one that has been
abolished. Though death penalty opponents regularly chronicle flaws
in capital punishment’s administration, rarely do they seriously advocate realistic legislative reforms that would enable modern death penalty systems to operate more efficiently and regularly. Notably, death
penalty opponents spotlight tales of wrongful convictions and botched
executions primarily to boost their advocacy for the elimination of
capital punishment altogether. Indeed, sophisticated abolitionists
realize that a death penalty system made truly more perfect is a death
penalty system more likely to garner broad public support and increase the number of state executions of convicted murderers.
For nearly all prosecutors and supporters of capital punishment,
existing death penalty systems are already, in a sense, too perfect because they readily enable defendants and their advocates to delay or
avoid the ultimate sanction. With decades often elapsing between a
capital verdict and even the setting of an execution date, proponents
of capital punishment are understandably far more concerned about
repeated appeals and extensive delays than they are troubled by the
occasional anecdote of a wrongful conviction or a botched execution
of a gruesome murderer. Moreover, sophisticated proponents of capital punishment realize that serious efforts to perfect a death penalty
system will provide defense lawyers and abolitionists with new opportunities to impede the progress of any murderer toward a state’s death
chamber.
Outside the context of lethal injection debates, there is ample evidence that few advocates are genuinely interested in making the administration of capital punishment more perfect. A few years ago,
then-Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney assembled a blue-ribbon
panel of experts to devise a death penalty system for his state that he
deemed “as foolproof as humanly possible.” Letter from Mitt Romney, Governor of Mass., to Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Mass. (Apr. 28, 2005) (on file
with author). Tellingly, his proposed more-perfect system received
virtually no support in Massachusetts: it was attacked on numerous
grounds by both death penalty proponents and opponents. Moreover, the astute procedural and substantive reforms suggested by Romney’s blue-ribbon panel—like those of many other groups of lawyers
urging capital improvements—have found few serious advocates and
have had virtually no traction in modern legislative debates in those
jurisdictions still in the business of state killing.

2008]

BAZE-D AND CONFUSED

322

The pragmatic disinterest in death penalty perfection largely accounts for why states have tended, in Professor Nathan’s words, to repress “public information related to lethal injection’s actual procedures and administration.” State officials believe, quite justifiably, that
any information-sharing good deed will be punished through new
rounds of litigation brought by death row defendants and death penalty opponents. State officials believe, quite justifiably, that most
everyone complaining about lethal injection protocols will not start
endorsing capital punishment if and when the state successfully develops a more perfect execution method. And, perhaps even more
importantly, state officials believe, also justifiably, that very few persons are genuinely concerned about relatively minor imperfections in
the administration of the death penalty.
3. Ignorance Is Bliss. For the vast majority of the public and lawmakers, the death penalty is a highly symbolic and inconsequential
aspect of governmental work. Even in the few active death penalty
states, capital cases are a tiny component of massive state criminal justice systems and an even more miniscule part of state governments’
broader activities. Practically speaking, the average citizen is impacted
far more by street cleaning schedules and school lunch menus than by
the day-to-day administration of the death penalty. Moreover, the average citizen assumes—correctly—that most prosecutors and judges
generally aspire to reduce the most extreme risks of error in the operation of the death penalty. Politically speaking, the average lawmaker
recognizes that voters will care about her basic position on the death
penalty, but she also realizes that the symbolism of her position is far
more important than any specifics.
These practical and political realities mean that the vast majority
of lawmakers and members of the public are blissfully ignorant concerning the modern death penalty’s imperfections. Indeed, only the
most engaged activists even try to keep up with the copious research
about the modern operation of the death penalty, and often lawmakers will resist efforts to commission official studies of the death penalty’s administration. Of course, neither the general public nor lawmakers favor a deeply flawed death penalty system, and profound
evidence of wrongful convictions or botched executions will often
prompt executive officials and legislators to begin a serious program
of reform. But when identified problems appear to be minor imperfections and not gross injustices, most people remain more interested
in the death penalty as an idea than as a practice. Indeed, by paying
little attention to the death penalty in practice, the public and their
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elected representatives can hold onto the blissfully ignorant belief that
our existing death penalty systems are as perfect as possible.
In the context of lethal injection protocols, the reality of blissful
ignorance is reflected in the fact that few are advocating for perfect
transparency. In our modern technological era, greater transparency
concerning lethal injection protocols could be easily achieved by having all jurisdictions digitally record all executions. But, to my knowledge, nobody has even seriously suggested videotaping all executions.
(It is notable, and telling, that thanks to a sneaky cell phone and YouTube, more Americans have seen the execution of Saddam Hussein
than any of the 1099 modern executions in the United States.)
These broader realities have an intriguing resonance now that the
lethal injection debates have finally reached the Supreme Court in
Baze. Notably, the Supreme Court’s modern death penalty jurisprudence seems to be driven, in fits and starts, by the goal of creating an
ever more perfect death penalty system through persistent tinkering
with the machinery of death. And, unlike the public and lawmakers,
the Justices cannot remain blissfully ignorant to the historical, medical
and legal issues surrounding lethal injection protocols and their imperfections. I am not sure what this will mean for the Court’s forthcoming work in Baze, but the points stressed above must be considered in understanding the likely reactions of the public and the
likely responses of government officials after Baze—no matter what the
Justices say.

2008]

BAZE-D AND CONFUSED

324

CLOSING STATEMENT
Alison J. Nathan
On several key points related to Baze v. Rees, Professor Berman
and I agree. Importantly, we appear to agree that state lethal injection protocols have been developed and administered in constitutionally problematic ways; that the ubiquity of the current lethal injection
process is the result of a cascade to mistaken consensus; that there has
been a significant lack of transparency surrounding the process by
which states execute death row inmates; and that, as a result of these
flaws, the Court in Baze must carefully scrutinize lethal injection protocols and procedures to ensure that they pass constitutional muster.
Beyond these points, Professor Berman reasonably takes my
Opening to task for failing to grapple with “why so many states have
tended to repress ‘public information related to lethal injection’s actual procedures and administration.’” In attempting to answer that
question himself, Professor Berman places the lethal injection debate
within the context of “three critical practical and political realities that
surround the modern administration of capital punishment.” And he
concludes that these realities “infect all legal and social debates over
capital punishment, and they significantly impede effective tinkering
with the machinery of death.” Although I concur with much of what
Professor Berman argues in laying out his three political and practical
realities—factors that result generally from the often polarized and
overly symbolic debate about the death penalty in the United States—
I do not agree that his observations fully answer the question of why
states refuse to allow so much information about lethal injection procedures and protocols into the public record. More importantly, his
observations concerning the lack of transparency and robust public
debate are not merely descriptive, as he suggests. Rather, these factors require that the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, vigorously scrutinize whether the realities of lethal injection procedures satisfy
constitutional demands.
Professor Berman’s first noted practical reality is that any system
operated by human beings, including the administration of the death
penalty, is fallible. In the lethal injection context, this means that
“there will always be at least some risk of error and unnecessary pain
in any state killing process.” This is unquestionably true, as the plaintiffs in Baze themselves acknowledge by advocating for a constitutional
standard that upholds a method of execution unless it “creates a signif-
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icant and avoidable risk that an inmate will suffer severe pain.” Brief for
Petitioners at 39, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439 (Nov. 5, 2007) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/
LethalInjection/Public/documents/bazebriefs/2007.11.05.ky.baze.scotusmertisbrief.pdf. Accordingly, it is not dispositive, or even legally
relevant, that lethal injection is an improvement over previously entrenched execution methods such as hanging, electrocution, and lethal gas. Nor do I agree with Professor Berman that the “modern debate over lethal injection protocols concerns whether states, after
adopting an improved, but still flawed execution method, should now
have to make their protocols even more perfect.” Considering the
fundamental constitutional right in issue, seeking reasonable improvements in light of existing technologies and information is not
the same as a disingenuous and unending search for an impossible-toachieve “perfection.” An analogy to voting technology is helpful.
Surely electronic voting machines offer some improvement over previous voting technology (no more dangling chads, for example).
Nevertheless, in light of the constitutional right at stake, voting rights
advocates are justified in seeking a paper trail requirement for electronic voting, even if the new technology is an improvement and even
if a paper trail still does not make electronic voting a perfect system.
Professor Berman’s response to my voting machine analogy might
well be that it fails because of his second political reality factor, what
he calls “pragmatic disinterest in death penalty perfection.” Perhaps
he would contend that unlike the voting technology context, in which
there are people genuinely concerned with assuring that every legitimate vote is counted, advocates on both sides of the death penalty debate have no interest in genuinely improving the capital punishment
system. In the lethal injection context (as well as other areas of the
death penalty debate beyond the scope of this exchange) I do not entirely agree. There are death penalty proponents—or at least those
who firmly believe that the death penalty is and should remain constitutional—who would argue genuinely that states can and should execute defendants in a way that reasonably guards against the severe
imposition of pain. There are also certainly death penalty proponents
who realize that the best way to safeguard public support for the death
penalty is through the adoption of execution methods that are—or at
least appear to be—as humane as reasonably possible. To borrow
from Professor Berman’s terminology, these individuals could be
deemed “sophisticated [death penalty] proponents.” The use in every
lethal injection state of the otherwise unnecessary paralytic agent,
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which can make potentially painful executions look like peaceful
slumber, may well benefit the “sophisticated [death penalty] proponent[’]s” cause.
I also disagree with Professor Berman that all who challenge the
administration of lethal injection seek only delay and are, at heart, entirely disinterested in genuine improvement of the execution process.
I gather these are Professor Berman’s “unsophisticated” abolitionists.
It is because of their efforts, Professor Berman contends, that states
repress public information related to lethal injection because “[s]tate
officials believe, quite justifiably, that any information-sharing good
deed will be punished through new rounds of litigation.” Professor
Berman’s cynical view overlooks that death penalty lawyers have an
ethical obligation to challenge unconstitutional conduct by the government. This obligation may include attempting to ensure that their
clients are executed in a manner consistent with the Eighth Amendment. The lawyers, of course, also have an ethical obligation not to
bring frivolous or vexatious litigation. Several years ago, challenges to
lethal injection were perceived by many as just that. However, given
the reaction of lower court judges to the evidence of maladministration and incompetence finally surfacing in these lawsuits, such legal
efforts appear vindicated. More importantly, I am unconvinced that
the lack of transparency results from states simply seeking to hasten
executions. If the underlying information could readily withstand
judicial scrutiny, states would be well advised to provide information
without the delay that has impeded judicial review of the merits of lethal injection procedures.
This previous point relates to Professor Berman’s final practical
and political reality factor: blissful ignorance. He argues that the
modern death penalty debate largely occurs at the symbolic level, with
little interest in a deeper understanding of the death penalty in its actual practice. I agree with this important observation, but see this
failure of informed public debate as precisely the value of the current
lethal injection litigation. Contrary to the impression Professor Berman leaves, transparency advocates have made serious attempts to
bring greater public access to executions through photographing or
video recording, but courts have consistently rejected the efforts. For
example, in Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2004), the
Eighth Circuit upheld a ban on the video recording of executions; the
Fifth Circuit refused to recognize a First Amendment right to film executions in Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977); and a
district court in Indiana denied a request to broadcast the execution
of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh in Entertainment Network,
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Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F.Supp. 2d 1002, 1013-14 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Lethal
injection litigation, and in particular such transparency-related efforts,
have the potential to dramatically change the national debate. Transparency places stark reality, rather than symbolism, at the center of
public consciousness and discourse concerning state-sponsored executions.
What then is the answer to Professor Berman’s question of why
states refuse to release information to the public about how they execute people? One answer is surely that defending the secrecy of lethal injection procedures is easier for the states than defending the
Rube Goldberg machine that is the pervasive three-drug protocol administered by the states. Claims of protecting the identity of executioners for “personal safety” reasons, for example, is easier than defending the employment of dyslexic doctors with multiple malpractice
suits against them who have been banned from engaging in executions in other jurisdictions. Similarly, arguing that states do not need
to disclose the drugs or dosage amounts used in the execution process
because doing so would be detrimental to “national security” is easier
than justifying the use of a paralytic drug that serves no purpose other
than to hide pain that would result from improper anesthetization.
Another potential explanation for the states’ insistence on secrecy
relates to a doctrinal argument that some states have used to defend
their current lethal injection procedures. These states note that in
the death penalty context, the Supreme Court has required “deference . . . to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal
system.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976). But the deference
rule rests on the assumption that states have carried out at least a minimal level of investigation into a procedure that eliminates the serious danger of unnecessary and cruel pain. As the history of lethal
injection demonstrates, the states never engaged in any such investigation. By refusing to release information about lethal injection protocols and procedures, states have largely been able to avoid having to
justify their problematic decision making.
Furthermore, the repression of the details of lethal injection procedures allows these states to hide behind the seeming consensus of a
majority of death penalty states, all of whom authorize execution pursuant to similar lethal injection processes. A consensus argument won
the day when, in 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states
from executing a person with mental retardation. Similarly, in 2005,
the Supreme Court held the execution of juvenile offenders unconsti-
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tutional in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). The Supreme
Court reached its conclusions in Atkins and Roper, at least in part, by
tallying the number of states that prohibited the execution of the
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders and deciding that because
more than a majority of states rejected the practices, those practices
conflicted with contemporary standards and, therefore, were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
But the standard Eighth Amendment consensus analysis is premised upon transparency and public knowledge of a penological practice from which a consensus for or against the practice can develop.
As I argued in my Opening, in the lethal injection context, the systemic failings of transparency disrupt this process. Moreover, the lack of
transparency obstructs the proper framing or level of generality of a
consensus analysis. At one level, it can be argued—as twenty states
and the United States have argued in an amicus brief filed in Baze—
that lethal injection, and even the three-drug protocol, is accepted by
a majority of states as the preferred method of execution. But the legal challenges to lethal injection, including the one the Supreme
Court has heard in Baze, are not challenges to lethal injection in the
abstract. Rather, they are challenges to the specific protocols and
procedures that states use to administer lethal injection. The point of
these challenges is that although states have chosen lethal injection as
a supposedly more humane alternative, and have adopted a drug protocol that is meant to anesthetize an inmate prior to the injection of
painful drugs, the implementation of the protocol in practice lends itself to a substantial risk that inmates will be improperly anesthetized,
will suffer excruciating pain, but will be paralyzed and thus unable to
make known their conscious suffering.
Thus, in Baze, the petitioners correctly contend that to the extent
a “consensus” analysis is relevant in the method-of-execution context,
there is in fact a consensus in favor of execution by anesthetized death
and the actual procedures challenged in Baze cannot stand because
they lie outside this consensus. In other words, the constitutional failure of the current three-drug lethal injection protocol and its implementation is that while it appears to produce an anesthetized death,
there exists an unnecessary risk that it in fact does not. Given the uninformed and non-transparent public debate that Professor Berman
has identified, it is the role of the Supreme Court to probe the troubling realities of lethal injection and to ensure that even seemingly
humane procedures actually satisfy the Constitution’s demands.
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Douglas A. Berman
I am pleased to conclude this Debate by noting yet again that Professor Nathan and I agree more than we disagree. In particular, like
Professor Nathan, I believe that the “significant lack of transparency
surrounding the process by which states execute death row inmates”
now demands that courts “vigorously scrutinize whether the realities of
lethal injection procedures satisfy constitutional demands.” Nevertheless, as Professor Nathan correctly surmises, I still have a “cynical view”
of the lethal injection litigation principally because, to my knowledge,
defendants have never offered to drop their Eighth Amendment
claims if states adopt a particular preferred execution protocol. Professor Nathan is justified in complaining that states haven’t been more
forthcoming about lethal injection realities. But states are justified in
complaining that defendants and defense attorneys haven’t been
more forthcoming about execution protocols they would consider
constitutionally unassailable.
Professor Nathan asserts that “it is not dispositive, or even legally
relevant, that lethal injection is an improvement over previously entrenched execution methods such as hanging, electrocution, and lethal gas.” But, even though the humane evolution of state execution
methods may not be of great legal significance as the Justices consider
the constitutional claims in Baze, this evolution (1) reveals that states
have been genuinely willing to improve their execution methods, and
(2) explains why states genuinely fear that defense attorneys, in Professor Nathan’s words, “seek only delay and are, at heart, entirely disinterested in genuine improvement of the execution process.” In this
context, Professor Nathan’s voting technology analogy is telling. In
the litigation over voting technologies, advocates make clear that they
principally desire a paper trail to accompany electronic voting methods. But, in the litigation over execution technologies, advocates
often obscure that they principally desire the elimination of all execution methods.
Importantly, I do not question either the judgment or ethics of
defense lawyers challenging lethal injection protocols; indeed, when I
have defended persons on death row, I have felt a professional obligation to raise any and every non-frivolous argument that might delay or
prevent my client’s execution. But the fact that defense attorneys
have an ethical responsibility to try to delay or prevent executions
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contributes to the “bunker mentality” that state officials have tended
to adopt in response to evidence about flaws in their lethal injection
protocols.
I emphasize these realities neither to justify nor excuse many
states’ troubling responses to the mounting evidence of problems in
the administration of the traditional three-drug lethal injection protocol. Rather, my goal is to spotlight the litigation “realpolitik” that will
necessarily attend, and may perhaps significantly inform, the Justices’
consideration of the arguments in Baze. Indeed, those Justices who
have previously expressed concerns about extended death row litigation will surely be cognizant of the fact that nearly two decades have
transpired since the Baze defendants committed the brutal murders
that landed them on death row. And, though technically Kentucky’s
execution protocol is all that is at stake in Baze, the Justices know that
their ruling in this case will greatly influence whether executions
across the country are few or frequent in the months and years ahead.
I close by stressing the litigation “realpolitik” because it helps explain not only why the Supreme Court has long avoided challenges to
execution methods, but also the real reason Baze presents difficulties
for the Justices. The Justices surely realize that, no matter how much
or how little they decide to tinker with the machinery of death in Baze,
the broader practical and political realities that surround the modern
administration of capital punishment ensure that the machinations of
death will persist.
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